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Summary 
 
Our study examines 281 federal court decisions from April 2001- May 2006 that 
ruled on challenges to labor arbitration awards. These award appeals are regulated by the 
Supreme Court’s Enterprise Wheel decision. District courts confirmed 77.6% of 
challenged awards, an increase of about 7 percentage points compared to our earlier 
studies of litigated awards from 1960 - 2001. The result was very similar for appellate 
cases— a confirmation rate of 76.3%, and nearly the same gain in percentage points.  
 
These results clearly suggest that the Supreme Court’s rebuke of lower courts in 
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. (2000) and Garvey (2001) have changed how judges 
review arbitrator rulings. But this uniformly positive development masks observable 
differences in the federal circuits where these cases were decided. 
 
• The Sixth Circuit routinely applies a four part essence test. This standard seems 
more intrusive than the simple essence test in Enterprise Wheel. The four part essence 
test has become so controversial among these judges that they decided en banc in May 
2006 to reconsider its use. Our data shed important new light on this development: The 
four part essence test yields outcomes that are similar to other Enterprise Wheel tests, but 
it stimulates an excessive amount of federal lawsuits.  
 
• On the opposite end of the award deference spectrum, courts in the Second 
Circuit enforce more than 90% of challenged awards. This trend is so clear that virtually 
no one there appeals a district court’s enforcement ruling. Courts in the Seventh Circuit 
have a similar confirmation rate, arrived at by applying Rule 11 sanctions to award 
challenges that are judged to be meritless. 
 
• Data show that judges in the Fifth Circuit are in an isolationist camp. At the 
district and appellate levels in this study, these courts confirmed awards in only 44.4% of 
the cases. This is similar to findings in our earlier studies. A correction is needed for the 
Fifth Circuit’s long deviation from the deferential posture that the Supreme Court has 
commanded. These data might enable Fifth Circuit judges to see their problem and 
correct it by exercising more restraint.  
 
• We found that 16 appellate decisions confirmed awards that were vacated by 
district courts, while 5 awards were vacated by appellate courts after these arbitrator 
rulings were confirmed by lower courts. This 3:1 ratio favoring award confirmation 
means that new precedents are reinforcing Enterprise Wheel messages of deference to 
district judges.  
 
Overall, the empirical results are healthy indicators for the national policy that 
favors arbitration. The Supreme Court’s on-going investment in promoting judicial 
deference to awards is paying dividends not only for the institution of labor arbitration, 
but by implication, for newer ADR applications in individual employment, commercial 
transactions, environmental disputes and others. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Context for This Empirical Research 
Two parties in a long-term relationship become embroiled in a dispute. A third 
person is drawn into their private circle and unwittingly complicates the relationship. 
Before long, their escalating quarrel is taken before a judge for resolution. TV fans of As 
The World Turns are familiar with this triangular intrigue. 
This summary also describes the subject of our empirical research in As the 
Enterprise Wheel Turns. Two parties in a long-term relationship— here, a union and 
employer— are entangled in a contract dispute. A third person, an arbitrator, enters into 
the controversy. Next, the arbitrator’s decision disturbs the underlying relationship. One 
of the parties cannot accept the ruling, and appeals to a federal judge.  
The Supreme Court has indulgently regulated this triangular affair since its 1957 
landmark decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills1— about the time that the 
popular TV soap opera first aired.2 Lincoln Mills authorized federal courts to fashion a 
common law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), including 
court petitions to confirm or vacate arbitrator awards that rule on grievances of alleged 
contract violations. In 1960, the Court set forth principles in three closely integrated 
decisions— now called the Trilogy3— to guide federal judges who are drawn into 
arbitration disputes. 
 
1 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court ruled that federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements, including arbitration provisions, arises under Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations 
Act of 1947, and not the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 450-51. 
2 See http://www.cbs.com/daytime/atwt/about/showinfo/. The show has run continuously since 
April 1956. 
3 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., infra note 4. 
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Trilogy standards for reviewing an arbitrator’s award were set forth in United 
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.4 Federal judges at that time 
understood the institutional history that led to the Trilogy. Unions were a force.5 Because 
grievance arbitration was agreed upon in most CBAs, Section 301 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (LMRA) provided a legal process to enforce this bargain.6 In 
a vital quid pro quo, unions promised not to strike if employers agreed to submit disputes 
to binding arbitration.7
But from the inception of the Trilogy, the judiciary’s role has been questioned. 
Skeptics claim that judges intrude on this private process by usurping the role of the 
arbitrator and adjudicating grievances.8 We take these concerns seriously because of the 
 
4 363 U.S. 593 (1960).  
5 THOMAS A. KOCHAN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 128 tbl.5-1 (1980) 
(showing that in 1956, 17,490,000 out of 52,408,000 employees, or 33.4%, were union members). 
6 S. REP. NO. 80-105 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 421 (1959). Also see H.R. REP. NO. 80-245 (1947), reprinted in 1 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 at 337 (1959), 
explaining congressional intent for enacting Section 301: 
When labor organizations make contracts with employers, such organizations should be 
subject to the same judicial remedies and processes in respect of proceedings involving 
violations of such contracts as those applicable to all other citizens. Labor organizations 
cannot justifiably ask to be treated as responsible contracting parties unless they are 
willing to assume the responsibilities of such contracts to the same extent as the other 
part must assume his.  
Compare to AT&T, infra note 22, at 648, observing that the Trilogy “precepts have served the industrial 
relations community well, and have led to continued reliance on arbitration, rather than strikes or lockouts, 
as the preferred method of resolving disputes arising during the term of a collective-bargaining agreement.”  
7 See R.W. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 31-32 (1965): “Indeed, it is apparent that 
the decisions of the Supreme Court which have so greatly enhanced labor arbitration . . . are in large part 
based on the theory that the arbitration clause is the quid pro quo for the no-strike clause.” The use of labor 
arbitration grew from the 1940s to the 1950s, and has been a mainstay ever since. Compare a 1944 survey, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN UNION AGREEMENTS 
2, 4 tbl. 1 col. 2 (73% of firms covered by a labor agreement had an arbitration provision in their contract) 
and a 1953 survey in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACT PROVISIONS 10, 4 tbl. 1 col. 2 (89% of firms covered by a labor agreement had an arbitration 
provision in their contract).   
8 A scholarly illustration appears in Thomas G.S. Christensen, The Disguised Review of the Merits 
of Arbitration Awards, 25 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. ARB. 99 (1973), criticizing Judge Paul Raymond Hays’ 
view that “the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to be wrong . . . [t]he question is whether he has authority to 
decide issues contrary to the provisions of the contract.’” Id. at 104. Arbitrator Christensen believed that 
acceptance of Judge Hays’ view “makes very real the warning of Enterprise that ‘plenary review by a court 
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potential for court review to reduce arbitration to a pre-trial discovery proceeding— 
adding delay and cost to a process that is supposed to be quick and inexpensive.9
This background highlights the importance of our empirical research on federal 
court review of labor arbitration awards. Debate among judges, academics, and attorneys 
as to the proper level of judicial deference is driven by textual analysis of appellate 
decisions.10 We do not believe that lead cases are accurate gauges of court behavior. So, 
in two earlier studies, we collected and analyzed data contained in over 1,783 federal 
court rulings on labor arbitration awards that were rendered from June 1960 – March 
2001.11 In the present study, we add 281 new cases from federal court decisions that were 
 
of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator’s decision is final, for in reality it 
would almost never be final.’” Id. Similar concerns are raised in Michael H. Gottesman, Enforceability of 
Awards: A Union Viewpoint, 41 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. ARB. 88 (1989); William B. Gould IV, Judicial 
Review of Labor Arbitration Awards— Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of AT&T 
and Misco, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 464, 464 (1989) (observing that in the 30 years since the Trilogy, “the 
landscape of judicial review of labor arbitration is now more reminiscent of a thirty years’ war than a 
substitute for strife once heralded”); Christopher T. Hexter, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: 
How the Public Policy Exception Cases Ignore the Public Policies Underlying Labor Arbitration, 34 ST.
LOUIS U.L.J. 77 (1989); Stephen R. Reinhardt, Arbitration and the Courts: Is the Honeymoon Over?, 40 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. ARB. 25 (1988); and Jan Vetter, Enforceability of Awards: Public Policy Post-Misco,
41 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. ARB. 75 (1989).  
9 Compare Production and Maint. Employees’ Local 504, Laborers’ Intern. Union of North Am. v. 
Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir. 1990), stating that “arbitration clauses are agreements to 
move cases out of court, to simplify dispute resolution, making it quick and cheap. . . .”   
10 We cite two especially significant critiques because their authors are widely respected. See 
David E. Feller, End of the Trilogy: The Declining State of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 18 (Sept. 1993) 
for a pessimistic assessment by a leading labor law professor who played a personal role in the original 
Trilogy litigation. Also consider the very negative assessment of fellow jurists by a D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals judge, in Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the 
Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT LAW REVIEW 3, 4 (1988): “In recent years, 
this long-standing policy of judicial deference has been significantly undercut by a series of lower court 
decisions that vacate arbitration awards on the ground that they conflict with public policy. In my view, 
these courts have engaged in unprincipled and unwarranted judicial activism. . . . Under the guise of public 
policy, therefore, these courts have substituted their own views of industrial justice for the views of the 
arbitrator.”  
11 Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance Arbitration 
Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 78, 98 (1992). This research analyzed 
1,148 federal district court decisions and 480 federal circuit court decisions that resulted in a court order 
which compelled or denied arbitration or which enforced or vacated an arbitrator’s award in whole or in 
part. These decisions were published after June 23, 1960 and before July 1, 1991. A follow-up study, 
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of 
Workplace Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 19, 50 tbl.1 (2001), reported data for court 
review of awards from 1991-2001. 
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issued between April 1, 2001 and May 31, 2006. Our extensive database puts us in a 
unique position to evaluate critical claims that arise in this on-going debate.  
But why does this matter? Our research is relevant to the Supreme Court’s 
continuing stewardship of this vital process. As we explain in more detail later, the 
Trilogy was sufficiently comprehensive to be the final word on this subject. But the Court 
has repeatedly felt obliged to warn lower courts from interfering with an arbitrator’s 
award. This litany suggests that Justices believe that too many federal courts fail to heed 
its strong message of deference— in effect, endorsing the recent view of critics12 that too 
many judges re-arbitrate contract disputes that were meant to be resolved by a final and 
binding award. Adding cogency to our empirical research, the Court issued two recent 
opinions that admonished federal judges.13 
As the Enterprise Wheel nears its 50th anniversary, more is at stake than the 
institution of labor arbitration. Private sector unions are waning.14 Strikes— the ultimate 
concern of Congress when it passed the law that led to Enterprise Wheel— are almost 
non-existent.15 But the Supreme Court’s docket shows that arbitration is expanding to 
lending,16 individual employment,17 commercial,18 international,19 and technology 
 
12 Infra notes 122-123.  
13 See Eastern, infra note 76, and Garvey, infra note 85.  
14 Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Unions: BLS Reports Percentage of Workers In Unions Still 12.5 
Percent, But Overall Numbers Up, DAILY LAB. REP’T (BNA No. 14), Jan. 23, 2006, at AA-1 (only 7.8% of 
U.S. workers in the private sector belong to a union, according to the most recent measurement).  
15 Strike activity remained very low, with only 22 major work stoppages in 2005, up from 17 in 
2004. See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Work Stoppages: Major Strikes, Lockouts Rose in 2005 But Lost Work 
Time Down By Half From ’04, DAILY LAB. REP’T (BNA No. 42), March 3, 2006, at D-1.    
16 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 U.S. 1204 (2006).  
17 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  
18 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).  
19 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995). 
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disputes.20 Even in water-use lawsuits between states, one can see the labor arbitration 
model as an ADR paradigm.21 While regulating these newer dispute resolution 
applications, the Supreme Court has relied on Trilogy lessons,22 and therefore has a large 
investment in the independent functioning of labor arbitration. 
B. Organization of This Article 
Our quantitative findings cannot be understood without some background. In Part 
II, we examine the standards of judicial review in Enterprise Wheel and related Trilogy 
cases.23 Part II.A demonstrates that Enterprise Wheel instructed judges in a patient, 
instructional voice.24 Part II.B shows that as the employment relationship was more 
regulated, tensions arose between the requirements of a CBA and new laws.25 This 
prompted employers to challenge arbitration awards on public policy grounds. In Misco,
the Supreme Court deterred courts from overturning awards that are inconsistent with 
public policies.26 More recently, in Eastern27 and Garvey,28 the Court has abandoned its 
collegial tone as Justices have grown weary of repeating the same award-deference 
message to federal judges. 
 
20 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).   
21 Consider Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 (2004), where two states disputed water rights to the 
Arkansas River. The Court said that “the need for a River Master is diminished by the fact that the parties 
may find it possible to resolve future technical disputes through arbitration.” Id. at 93. It continued by 
describing a tri-partite arbitration model that is familiar to railroads and airlines under the Railway Labor 
Act: “In case of an equally divided vote, the Administration (with the consent of both States) may refer a 
matter for resolution to the Representative of the United States or other arbitrator or arbitrators. The 
arbitrator’s determinations are binding.” Id.
22 E.g., AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 
(1986) (“The first principle gleaned from the Trilogy is that arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”). 
23 Infra notes 47 - 98.  
24 Infra notes 48 - 68.  
25 Infra notes 69 - 98.  
26 Infra notes 69 - 71.  
27 Infra notes 72 - 74.   
28 Infra notes 76 - 84.   
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Part III.A explains our research methodology,29 and Part III.B reports our 
statistical findings.30 Finding No. 1 shows that courts now enforce awards in about 76% 
of their decisions, a marked increase from past years.31 Finding No. 2 reports that more 
appellate decisions reverse a lower court’s non-enforcement order, compared to appellate 
decisions that vacate an award which a lower court has enforced.32 
Courts enforce between 70% - 80% of challenged awards, regardless of the legal 
argument, in Finding No. 3A.33 The four part essence test is examined in Finding No. 
3B.34 This test yields the same enforcement rate as other legal arguments that challenge 
awards. Unfortunately, it also stimulates excessive award lawsuits. Two court opinions 
provide context for these statistics. One demonstrates that the test can be applied with 
deference,35 and the other illustrates intrusive court review.36 Finding No. 3C shows that 
the public policy test does not diminish court enforcement of arbitrator rulings— an 
important change from our last study.37 Three cases explain this outcome. One is an 
example of an employer who dropped its public policy challenge after the Supreme Court 
strongly discouraged these lawsuits in Eastern.38 The second case shows that other 
employers blend a public policy argument with the idea that an unlawful award cannot 
draw its essence from the contract.39 So far, this approach has not persuaded judges. 
Finally, there is the case of a nurse who was reinstated after violating a drug-dispensing 
 
29 Infra notes 85 - 98.  
30 Infra notes 99 - 106.  
31 Infra notes 107 - 224.  
32 Infra notes 109 - 110.  
33 Infra notes 111 - 113.   
34 Infra notes 114 - 144.  
35 Infra notes 127 - 133.  
36 Infra notes 134 - 144.  
37 Infra notes 145 - 193.  
38 Infra notes 150 - 167.  
39 Infra notes 168 - 176.  
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policy.40 It shows the great deference that courts now pay to awards in the face of 
continuing public policy challenges. 
Finding No. 4 shows that the Second and Seventh Circuits are significantly more 
deferential to arbitration, and the Fifth Circuit is significantly less deferential, compared 
to other courts.41 A case on Rule 11 sanctions demonstrates why courts in the Seventh 
Circuit are so deferential.42 A second case cleverly communicated this court’s policy on 
great deference.43 In contrast, a Fifth Circuit case shows that judges re-arbitrated a 
grievance while vacating an award.44 It contradicts the deference precepts in Eastern and 
Garvey. Finding No. 5 puts our present findings in a historical light by showing that 
award enforcement is now at its peak in our 46 year database of cases.45 
Part IV reports the general conclusions and implications from these findings.46 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL COURTS:
FROM PATIENT GUIDANCE TO REPROACHFUL REMINDERS 
In our earlier studies, we explained the reviewing standards in Enterprise Wheel 
and related Trilogy decisions.47 Repeating this entire background is unnecessary, but 
omitting this context is also unwise. In developing this part of our Article, we have two 
aims. The Supreme Court’s award reviewing principles are related to the research 
variables and results that appear later in the Article. Second, we focus on the Supreme 
Court’s tone in talking to other federal courts since 1960. Its collegiality has worn thin, 
 
40 Infra notes 177 - 193.  
41 Infra notes 194 - 220.  
42 Infra notes 196 - 205.  
43 Infra notes 206 - 207.  
44 Infra notes 208 - 220.  
45 Infra notes 221 - 224.  
46 Infra notes 225 - 234.  
47 The most complete history appears in LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public 
Courts, supra note 11, at 29-40.  
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descending from patient guidance in the Trilogy to verbal jabs. This subtlety is easy to 
overlook because Supreme Court rulings provide more substantive information. But, 
while recently overseeing judicial review of labor arbitration awards, the Court has made 
no new ruling. Instead, its opinions have served as public notices to judges and attorneys 
to treat awards as final resolutions to grievances.  
A. Enterprise Wheel’s Patient Guidance for Judges Who Review Awards  
 In Enterprise Wheel, an arbitrator’s award reduced the termination of several 
employees to ten day suspensions.48 After the employer refused to comply with the 
ruling,49 the matter was taken up by the federal courts. The Fourth Circuit denied 
enforcement to the award,50 but the Supreme Court reversed this ruling.51 In a short 
opinion, the Enterprise Wheel Court said much. Setting a tone for great deference, the 
majority said that the “[r]efusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is 
the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.”52 This is 
because the “federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined 
if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.”53 
Adding substance to this respectful approach, Enterprise Wheel said that an 
arbitrator is “to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a 
problem (our emphasis).”54 We emphasize informed judgment because these two words 
say something about the Court’s understanding of labor arbitration. Arbitrators are 
selected by the parties because they are familiar with the peculiarities of unionized work 
 
48 Enterprise Wheel, supra note 4, at 595.  
49 Id.
50 Id. at 595-96.  
51 Id. at 599.  
52 Id. at 596.  
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 597.  
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in an industrial setting.55 While collective bargaining agreements are contracts, they are 
not bargained and administered like commercial transactions.56 
Enterprise Wheel also mentioned fair solution of a problem (our emphasis). In 
using this expression the Court said that an arbitrator plays a more complex role than a 
judge in contract litigation. When arbitrators reach a fair solution to a problem, courts 
must understand “the need . . . for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of situations. The 
draftsmen may never have thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a 
particular contingency.”57 
But Enterprise Wheel provided judges grounds to deny enforcement to an award: 
“Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective 
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice (our 
emphasis).”58 We highlight confined to interpretation and application because this 
passage is in tension with Enterprise Wheel’s idea that an arbitrator serves as a problem 
solver. Confining an arbitrator to interpreting and applying contract terms creates a 
judicial check on arbitrator awards. 
 An arbitrator “may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award 
is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement 
(our emphasis).”59 Our research shows this is the most common argument in post-award 
 
55 Id. at 596, n.2.  
56 Id. at 599, explaining that the agreement by unions and employers to submit contract disputes to 
labor arbitrators is founded in their confidence in this neutral’s abilities. More evidence of this distinction 
appears in Warrior & Gulf, supra note 3, at 578 (“In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for 
litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife.”). 
57 Id. at 597.  
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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litigation.60 Essence is emphasized to demonstrate the abstruse quality of this test.  
Enterprise Wheel also stated that a “mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying 
an award, which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his 
authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award. Arbitrators have no obligation 
to the court to give their reasons for an award.”61 An award should not be disturbed 
unless the arbitrator “has abused the trust the parties confided in him and has not stayed 
within the areas marked out for his consideration.”62 A court should not vacate an award 
merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator’s construction of the agreement.  
Enterprise Wheel patiently guided federal judges. The Court’s voice was 
instructional when it said that “the question of interpretation of the collective bargaining 
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s construction which was 
bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns construction of the contract, 
the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is 
different from his.”63 
Other Trilogy decisions added to Enterprise Wheel’s body of law for reviewing 
awards. American Manufacturing noted that the “function of the court is very limited 
when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the 
arbitrator,” because it is “the arbitrator’s judgment . . . that was bargained for.”64 Warrior 
& Gulf noted that the arbitrator “is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by 
superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept . . . . He is rather part of a 
 
60 See Table 1, showing that award challenges relied on the essence argument more often (139 
times in a sample of 201 awards) than any other.  
61 Enterprise Wheel, supra note 4, at 567-68.  
62 Id. at 567. 
63 Id. 
64 American Mfg., supra note 3, at 595.   
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system of self-government created by and confined to the parties.”65 In this vein, “[t]he 
labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of 
the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear 
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.”66 The 
decision also said that arbitrators have special competence to resolve workplace disputes: 
“The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the courts; the 
considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed be foreign to the 
competence of courts.”67 Warrior & Gulf created a paradox for judges by allowing an 
arbitrator to consider matters not contained in a contract.68 
B. Sterner Messages for Judges Who Review Awards 
As government regulation of the employment relationship grew by the 1980s, 
laws impinged on working conditions that were otherwise governed by a CBA. To 
illustrate, new regulations authorized employers to implement drug testing.69 
Controversies arose when arbitrators reinstated employees who were discharged without 
just cause for drug violations.70 Some employers challenged these awards on grounds that 
reinstatement undermined criminal laws and workplace regulations.71 
65 Warrior & Gulf, supra note 3, at 578.    
66 Id. at 582.  
67 Id. at 581.  
68 Id. at 581, noting: “The parties expect that his judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not 
only what the contract says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such factors as the 
effect upon productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment 
whether tensions will be heightened or diminished.” 
69 Congress passed the Drug-Free Workplace Act in 1988, which authorized federal contractors to 
implement drug-abuse prevention and penalty programs for offenders. 41 U.S.C. app. § 702(a) (1994). This 
paved the way for the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991, 41 U.S.C. app. § 2717 
(1994). This law directed the U.S. Department of Transportation to establish mandatory substance-abuse 
prevention requirements for 8.1 million workers in safety sensitive jobs.   
70 E.g., Florida Power Corp. v. IBEW Local 433, 847 F2d 680 (11th Cir. 1988). 
71 See district court rulings that vacated awards on public policy grounds in Iowa Electric Light & 
Power Co. v. Int’l B’hd of Electrical Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987), and Delta Air Lines v. Airline 
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In United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco,72 the Supreme Court discouraged 
federal courts from upsetting awards that contradict the spirit but not the substance of a 
public policy. In a notable refinement of Trilogy principles, Misco warned lower courts 
from interfering with “improvident, even silly factfinding.”73 The Court reminded judges: 
“This is hardly a sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed by the parties 
determined to be the historical facts.”74 
But some judges continued to meddle in these public policy cases,75 prompting 
the Supreme Court in 2000 to restate its ground rules for reviewing these awards in 
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers District 17.76 A coal company 
fired an employee on two different occasions after concluding that he used marijuana 
while driving heavy machinery on a public highway.77 Separate arbitration awards 
reinstated him with conditions after finding that just cause was lacking.78 The company 
refused to comply with the second award, contending that it violated a U.S. Department 
of Transportation rule stating that “the greatest efforts must be expended to eliminate the 
. . . use of illegal drugs . . . by those individuals . . . are involved in . . . the operation of 
 
Pilots Ass’n, 686 F.Supp. 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1987). 
72 484 U.S. 29 (1987). An arbitrator reinstated a paper mill worker who was fired after he was 
arrested in the company parking lot on a drug charge. Lower courts vacated the award— and thus, the 
Company did not reinstate the grievant— because they believed that it would violate a public policy against 
operating dangerous machinery by drug-users. Id. at 35. Misco reversed these rulings, holding that awards 
may be set aside only if they “would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, 
and is to be ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of 
supposed public interests.” Id. at 43. 
73 Id. at 39.  
74 Id. 
75 E.g., Delta Air Lines v. Airline Pilots Association, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988); Newsday, Inc. 
v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990); and Gulf Coast Indus. Workers 
Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993). 
76 531 U.S. 57 (2000).  
77 Id. at 60.  
78 Id. at 60–61.  
AS THE ENTERPRISE WHEEL TURNS 13
. . . trucks.”79 Rejecting the employer’s argument, the Supreme Court noted that DOT 
rules also favor rehabilitation of drug users, and do not preclude reinstatement of 
offenders to driving positions.80 
Eastern reminded judges to review awards with great deference. Its stern tone in 
addressing federal judges is highlighted: 
• “[B]oth employer and union have granted to the arbitrator the authority to 
interpret the meaning of their contract’s language, including such words as just cause.”81 
• “They have bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement. And 
courts will set aside the arbitrator’s interpretation of what their agreement means only in 
rare instances (emphasis added).”82 
• “[A]s long as an honest arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the 
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he 
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision (emphasis added).” 
cause.83 
• “[T]he proper judicial approach to a labor arbitration award is to refuse to 
review the merits.”84 
These reminders to judges should have sufficed. Apparently, though, the Supreme 
Court believed it needed to reinforce its award deference policy. So, one year later, in 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey,85 the Court used a particularly 
egregious example of judicial interference in arbitration to speak again to judges. An 
 
79 Id. at 63.  
80 Id. at 64.  
81 Id. at 61.  
82 Id. at 62.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 532 U.S. 504 (2001).  
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arbitrator denied a grievance from a star baseball player who alleged that team owners 
conspired to limit his contract offers.86 A federal district court denied Steve Garvey’s 
appeal to vacate the award.87 But the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with 
instructions to vacate the award.88 The district court ordered a remand to the arbitrator 
without vacating the award, causing Garvey to appeal again.89 This time, the appeals 
court reversed the district court, and directed that it remand the case to the arbitration 
panel with instructions to enter an award for Garvey in the amount he claimed.90 By this 
order, the Ninth Circuit re-arbitrated the grievance. 
In acerbic language, the Supreme Court held up the Ninth Circuit’s review of the 
arbitrator’s award as an example to avoid. At the heart of this arbitration, the parties 
disputed the credibility of a 1996 letter written, by a baseball team owner, which 
supported Garvey’s collusion theory. The arbitrator did not find the letter credible, 
prompting the Ninth Circuit to conclude that this fact-finding was “inexplicable” and 
“border[ed] on the irrational.”91 
The Supreme Court castigated the Ninth Circuit for insincerely reciting Trilogy 
principles. And the Court embarrassed the Ninth Circuit by calling its behavior “nothing 
short of baffling.”92 Garvey emphasized that “established law ordinarily precludes a court 
from resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual 
determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”93 Making no effort to 
 
86 Id. at 506.  
87 Id. at 507.   
88 Id. at 508.  
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 510.   
93 Id. at 511.  
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veil its blame, Garvey charged that the “Court of Appeals usurped the arbitrator’s role by 
resolving the dispute and barring further proceedings, a result at odds with this governing 
law.”94 The Court added: “The arbitrator’s analysis may have been unpersuasive to the 
Court of Appeals, but his decision hardly qualifies as serious error, let alone irrational or 
inexplicable error. And, as we have said, any such error would not justify the actions 
taken by the court.”95 Garvey sent a clear, reinforcing message to the federal judiciary: 
Do not overturn “the arbitrator’s decision because it disagree[s] with the arbitrator’s 
factual findings, particularly those with respect to credibility.”96 And do not resolve the 
merits of the parties’ dispute.97 Instead, if a court cannot enforce an award, it must 
remand the matter “for further arbitration proceedings.”98 
III. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS 
A. Research Methods 
We used research methods from our earlier empirical studies.99 The sample was 
derived from Westlaw’s internet service. Using an appropriate federal law database 
(FLB-ALL), we employed keywords such as “TRILOGY” or “WARRIOR & GULF” or 
“ENTERPRISE WHEEL” or “AMERICAN MANUFACTURING,” or “MISCO,” or 
“EASTERN ASSOCIATED COAL,” or “GARVEY.” In order to be included, a case 
involved a post-award dispute between a union and employer in which the arbitrator’s 
ruling was challenged. 
 
94 Id.
95 Id. at 511, n.2.  
96 Id. at 510.  
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 For elaboration see LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice in supra note 11, at 46-48.    
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The sample was limited to decisions from April 1, 2001 to May 31, 2006.100 
When a potential case was identified, we read it to see if it met our criteria. A case was 
added when it (1) was made either by a federal district or circuit court pursuant to some 
form of federal jurisdiction, (2) involved award confirmation or vacatur, and (3) had an 
employer and union as parties. A decision was not included if it failed to meet any 
criterion. 
For clarity, we describe related cases that were excluded: (1) an award that was 
ruled on by a state court,101 or administrative agency,102 (2) an action to compel 
arbitration,103 (3) a labor arbitration award that was challenged by an individual 
employee, rather than a party to the underlying labor agreement,104 or (4) an arbitration 
award resulting from an individual employment agreement.105 
Once a case met the criteria, it was checked against a roster of previously read and 
coded cases to avoid duplication. In its final form, this roster appears in the Appendix. 
Next, data were extracted from each case for the following variables: (1) federal circuit in 
which court was located, (2) year of district decision, (3) year of circuit court decision, 
(4) type of issue that was ruled on by the arbitrator, (5) party who prevailed in the 
arbitration award, (6) party who challenged the award, (7) legal arguments made by party 
 
100 We started the current database at the point where our 1991-2001 ended.  
101 Dayton v. AFSCME, Ohio Council 8, 2005 WL 3240794 (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 2005). These 
cases were excluded to focus on federal court behavior. 
102 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Am. Fed. of Gov’t Employees, Local 2805, 2005 WL 
1902554 (F.L.R.A. 2005). Because these cases were adjudicated by administrative law judges, rather than 
Article III federal judges, they were excluded.  
103 R.J. Corman Derailment Serv., L.L.C. v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 150, 
422 F.3d 522 (7th Cir. 2005). These actions occurred before an award was rendered.  
104 Smith v. Lyondell Citgo Refining, 2005 WL 2875306 (S.D. Tex. 2005). These cases alleged 
that a union failed to represent an employee properly or fairly, and are fundamentally different from our 
cases. 
105 Lee v. McDonald Securities, Inc., 2004 WL 2535277 (N.D. Il. 2004). These cases are typically 
in non-union settings, and often involve a mandatory arbitration agreement— quite different from the 
negotiated arbitration clauses that are in our cases.  
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who challenged the award,106 (8) party who won at the district court level, (9) district 
court ruling on motion to confirm or vacate an award, (10) party who won at the circuit 
court level, and (11) circuit court ruling on motion to confirm or vacate an award. 
B. Research Findings 
We found 201 labor arbitration awards that were appealed to a federal district 
court and ruled upon by a judge. In 80 cases, a party appealed the district court order to a 
federal circuit court, and received a second decision. In 45.9% of the awards, arbitrators 
decided a termination issue. They ruled on lesser forms of discipline in another 4.6% of 
cases. The next most common issues were work jurisdiction-subcontracting (18.6%), and 
work conditions (9.8%). Court rulings were unevenly distributed by federal circuit. More 
than half of the cases were from the Sixth (26.4%), Eighth (13.4%), and Third Circuits 
(11.4%).107 In the next cluster were the Fifth (9.0%), Seventh (8.5%), Second (7.5%), 
Ninth (7.5%), and First Circuits (7.0%). Few cases occurred in the Fourth (3.5%), 
Eleventh (2.5%), D.C. (2.5%), and Tenth Circuits (1.0%). In reporting the following 
findings, we also examine textual details of selected cases. This explains developments 
that are not obvious in the data.  
• Finding No. 1: Federal Courts Enforce More Than 76% of Challenged Awards. 
Table 1 shows that district court judges confirmed 156 out of 201 awards, 
yielding an enforcement rate of 77.6%.108 Appellate courts enforced 61 of the 80 
contested awards, for a 76.3% confirmation rate. 
 
106 We coded each type of argument individually because many award challenges rely on more 
than one legal theory.  
107 These three circuits accounted for 51.2% of our national sample.   
108 The terms enforce and enforcement are interchangeable with confirm and confirmation.    
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Table 1 
Labor Arbitration Awards Reviewed By Federal Courts 
Using Trilogy and FAA Standards 
April 1, 2001 – May 31, 2006   (N = 201 Awards) 
Appealed Awards District Court Rulings   Appeals Court Rulings    
Basis For Challenge of Award   
Trilogy (Authority)                              96/125           76.8%               36/51                 70.6% 
Trilogy (Essence)                               106/139           76.3%               43/60                 70.5% 
Trilogy (Four-Part Essence)                  24/32            75.0%                8/10                 80.0% 
Trilogy (Fact Finding)                           17/23            73.9%                7/9                   77.8%  
Trilogy (Public Policy)                          34/42            81.0%              18/22                 81.8% 
Trilogy (Brand of Justice)                     17/24             70.8%               4/9                   44/4% 
FAA (Evident Partiality)                        5/5              100.0%               1/1                 100.0% 
FAA (Misconduct)                                 4/4              100.0%               2/2                 100.0% 
FAA (Exceeds Power)                          14/15             93.3%               4/4                 100.0% 
FAA (Manifest Disregard)                      4/7               57.1%               3/4                   75.0%    
Miscellaneous— Incomplete Award    13/17             76.5%               3/3                100.0% 
 
Miscellaneous— Punitive Award          2/2              100.0%               0 
 
Miscellaneous— Fraudulent Award      4/4             100.0%               4/4                    100.0% 
• Finding No. 2: Appellate Courts Confirmed Awards That District Courts Vacated 
Three Times More Often Than Appellate Courts Vacated Awards That District 
Courts Confirmed. 
 
Sixteen appellate decisions confirmed awards that were vacated by district 
courts,109 while five awards were vacated by appellate courts after these arbitrator rulings 
 
109 See Airline Professional Assoc. of Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1224 v. 
ABX Air, Inc., 274 F.3d 1023 (6th Cir. 2001); Boston Medical Center v. Service Employees Int’l Union No. 
285 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2001); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 266 
F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2001); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St. 
Louis, 307 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2002); Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2629, 336 
F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2003); City Market, Inc. v. Local No. 7, United Food & Comm. Workers Int’l Union, 116 
Fed. Appx. 960 (10th Cir. 2004); Eisenmann Corp. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 24, 323 
F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2003); Finley Lines Joint Protection Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 312 
F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2002); Huber, Hunt & Nichols v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of 
Plumbing and Pipefitters, 282 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 2002); Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 139 v. 
J.H. Findorff, Inc., 393 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2004); Keebler Co. v. Truck Drivers, Local 170, 247 F.3d 8 (1st 
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were confirmed by lower courts.110 
• Finding No. 3(A): The Frequency of Court Confirmation of Awards Did Not 
Significantly Vary by the Type of Legal Argument. 
 
Table 1 shows the frequency of Trilogy, Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),111 and 
miscellaneous arguments that lawyers used to challenge awards. There was no 
statistically significant relationship between a legal argument and court rulings. Whatever 
the argument, courts enforced between 70% - 80% of arbitrator rulings.  
There were two exceptions, but they were not statistically significant. When a 
party contended that an award violated the FAA’s manifest disregard of the law 
standard,112 district courts enforced only 57.1% of these awards. However, this was 
observed in only 3 out of 7 cases. Similar results occurred at the circuit court level, when 
a party contended under Enterprise Wheel that an arbitrator applied his own brand of 
 
Cir. 2001); Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass’n, 429 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2005); Teamsters 
Local No. 5 v. Formosa Plastics, Corp., 363 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2004); Teamsters Local No. 58 v. BOC 
Gases, 249 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2001); United Paperworkers Int’l Union, Local 1737 v. Inland Paperboard & 
Packaging, Inc., 25 Fed. Appx. 316 (6th Cir. 2001); and Weber Aircraft Inc. v. Gen. Warehousemen & 
Helpers Union, Local 767, 253 F.3d 821 (5th Cir. 2001).   
110 See Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. UAW Local Union 985, 134 Fed. Appx. 866 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Local Union No. 744, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 280 F.3d 1133 (7th Cir. 
2002); Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers Int’l Union, 
Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2004); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
391 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2004); and Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Local Union No. 272, IBEW, 276 F.3d 174 
(3d Cir. 2001). For insight on a new Justice’s deferential view of arbitration, see Judge Alito’s dissenting 
opinion— expressing a view that supported the union’s position in this litigation. Id. at 182, stating that: 
the arbitrator’s decision drew its essence from and was based on a construction of the 
anti-discrimination section. That the arbitrator probably misconstrued that provision is 
beside the point. The parties bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of the agreement, 
and that is what they got. By intervening to rescue the Pennsylvania Power Company 
from one of the consequences of its bargain, the majority has exceeded the proper scope 
of our court’s authority. 
111 Labor arbitration awards are occasionally reviewed under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 
§ 10 (1994). The law authorizes courts to vacate an award where (1) where the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption by the arbitrators; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient 
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other 
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded 
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject 
matter submitted was not made. 
112 E.g., Electrolux Home Products v. UAW, 416 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2005).    
AS THE ENTERPRISE WHEEL TURNS 20
industrial justice.113 In 5 out of 9 cases (55.6%) courts refused to enforce an award.  
• Finding No. 3(B): The Four Part Essence Test Makes No Significant Difference in 
Court Enforcement of Arbitrator Rulings. 
 
The results in Table 2 are especially noteworthy in light of a current controversy 
in the Sixth Circuit. For the past 20 years, this court has fashioned its own version of 
Enterprise Wheel’s essence test. In a lead case, Cement Divs., National Gypsum Co. v. 
United Steelworkers, Local 135,114 the Sixth Circuit said that an award fails to draw its 
essence from a collective bargaining agreement if any of the following is true: (1) it 
conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes additional requirements not 
expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is not rationally supported by or derived 
from the agreement; or (4) it is based on general considerations of fairness and equity 
instead of the exact terms of the agreement.115 By requiring a labor arbitration award to 
jump through four hoops for enforcement, this standard does not look like the picture of 
judicial deference that Enterprise Wheel painted.  
 The test has generated controversy by appearing to contradict the same circuit’s 
pronouncement that appeals of arbitration awards are judged by “one of the narrowest 
standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence.”116 In 2006, this tension 
came to a head. Judge Sutton, in Michigan Family Resources, Inc. v. Service Employees 
Int’l Union Local 517M,117 wrote a lengthy opinion to support his view that the four part 
essence test “made it easier to vacate an arbitration award on the merits than the Supreme 
 
113 E.g., Sterling Fluid Systems (USA), Inc. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local Union No. 
7, 2005 WL 1653434 (6th Cir. 2005). 
114 793 F.2d 759 (6th Cir. 1986).  
115 Id. at 766.    
116 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 514-15 (6th Cir. 
1999).  
117 438 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 2006) (Judge Sutton, concurring).  
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Court meant it to be.”118 Voicing unusual concern that “[r]epeated incantations of our test 
seem to have led us to vacate a surprising number of arbitration awards,”119 he conducted 
his own empirical research of Sixth Circuit rulings from 1986 through 2006 and found 
that “we have vacated 29% (10 out of 34) of labor-arbitration awards that we have 
reviewed on merits-based grounds.”120 Judge Sutton asked: “Who among the practicing 
bar would not appeal an award that has a one-in-four chance of winning?”121 
This was not the first criticism of the four part essence test. An especially critical 
scholar remarked that this court’s “variant of the essence construct sweeps away all 
pretense of judicial deference to the contract interpretation and application decisions of 
the arbitrator.”122 Another expert concluded that “the Sixth Circuit serves as an example 
of the circuits’ attempted end run around the Supreme Court’s rulings.”123 
Our findings speak in two important ways to this controversy. On one hand, they 
refute Judge Sutton’s concern by showing that when a court invokes this standard, the 
award enforcement rate does not drop from the high national norms in this study.124 In 
other words, a party who challenges an award on this basis is no more likely to succeed 
than by using any other legal argument. 
 But we find statistical support for Judge Sutton’s concern that the four part 
 
118 Id. at 658.  
119 Id. at 662.    
120 Id.
121 Id. The judge also found that among unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit vacated 25% of 
those awards (19 out of 75) on similar grounds. Id.
122 Stephen L. Hayford, Unification of the Law of Labor Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 781, 821 (2000). 
123 David E. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review of Labor 
Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 292, 303 (1998). 
124 Courts still enforce awards to an overwhelming extent. District courts confirmed 24 out of 32 
awards (75.0%), while 8 out of 10 appeals courts confirmed awards that were challenged under the four 
part essence test.   
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essence test invites too many award challenges.125 More than one-fourth of our national 
sample (26.4%) originated in the Sixth Circuit. Strengthening our inference, the Third 
Circuit also uses the four part essence test.126 Although it covers a small territory, this 
circuit ranked third in the percentage of cases that appear in our sample (11.4%).  
 We briefly turn our attention from data to qualitative analysis. Bixby Medical 
Center, Inc. v. Michigan Nurses Ass’n,127 illustrates a Sixth Circuit court’s deferential use 
of the four part essence test. The employer changed health insurance coverage for its 
workers by increasing deductibles and co-payments.128 The hospital contended that the 
CBA did not require it to maintain a consistent level of health benefits.129 Ruling for the 
union, an arbitrator ordered the hospital to cease making unilateral benefit changes.130 
The hospital attempted to vacate the award before a district court but lost its 
challenge. The Sixth Circuit focused on contract language that gave the employer the 
right to select or change insurance carriers, but this right was conditioned on providing 
 
125 Id. The judge also found that among unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit vacated 25% of 
those awards (19 out of 75) on similar grounds. Id.
126 See Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-Indus., Chemical and Energy Workers Intern. 
Union Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809, 817 (3d Cir. 2004). The decision is explained in some detail because 
it demonstrates that this circuit invites a disproportionate amount of award challenges. The employer 
unilaterally implemented a zero-tolerance substance abuse policy at all of its facilities, citing the hazardous 
nature of its refining and manufacturing processes. Id. at 811-12. The arbitrator issued a mixed award. He 
found no contract violation in the company’s unilateral adoption and implementation of this substance 
abuse policy. Id. at 814. He also found that the mandatory, random testing procedure was both proper and 
reasonable. Id. However, he sustained the local’s challenge to the zero tolerance policy, believing that it 
was unreasonable not to provide erring employees a second chance. Id. at 814-15. He fortified his thinking 
by stating that this “is especially so where the DOT regulations permit second chance or rehabilitation 
opportunities. I therefore find that the Policy should be modified in that regard.” Id. at 814. The Third 
Circuit reversed the district court order that enforced the award, using the fourth element in the essence 
test: “However, an arbitrator’s opinion and award based on ‘general considerations of fairness and equity,’ 
as opposed to the exact terms of the CBA, fails to derive its essence from the CBA.” Id. at 817. The court 
noted that the agreement said that “the arbitrator shall not substitute his judgment for that of the Company 
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 813 (although “the award here comported with the 
arbitrator’s view of fairness . . . [it] did not draw its essence from the CBA.”). 
 127 142 Fed. Appx. 843 (6th Cir. 2005). 
128 Id. at 844.  
129 Id.
130 Id.
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the same benefits.131 The court found that the arbitrator construed the CBA in light of 
these two sections, and concluded that she provided “a fair construction of the parties’ 
agreement.”132 The court also approved the arbitrator’s remedy, which ordered only 
prospective relief.133 
However, we also found inappropriate examples of judicial review under the four 
part essence test. Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. UAW Local Union 985134 is a case in point. While 
closing its plant on October 17, 2001 the company refused to pay vacation pay benefits to 
employees who did not work for it on January 1, 2002.135 The CBA provided that 
eligibility for payment of vacation benefits is determined in reference to a “vacation 
year,” defined as “the calendar year period from January 1st to December 31st.”136 In 
ruling for the union, and awarding vacation pay to all employees who were laid-off 
before 2002, the arbitrator reasoned that these workers were not at fault for failing to 
work the full year, and therefore “[i]t would be unreasonable to cause such forfeitures 
particularly where an employee has no control over the situation.”137 
The Sixth Circuit vacated the award138 because it was based upon “general 
considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms of the agreement.”139 The 
court said that “the phrase ‘actually working’ is unambiguous— an employee must work 
 
131 Id. at 849.  
132 Id.
133 Id. (bargaining remedy was found by the court to be “a fair solution to the problem presented, 
and we will not question it”).  
134 134 Fed. Appx. 866 (6th Cir. 2005).  
135 Id. at 867.   
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 868.  
139 Id.
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on January 1 to be eligible for vacation pay.”140 The arbitrator was faulted for finding 
contractual ambiguity, where the court believed none existed, as a means to preclude the 
contract’s harsh effect on some employees.141 In basing his ruling on considerations of 
reasonableness, the arbitrator disregarded the contract.142 Thus, he failed “to enforce the 
labor contract as written,”143 while imposing his own brand of industrial justice.  
These judges failed to distinguish between reviewing an award for error, and 
reviewing to see if the arbitrator based the award on the contract. They did the former, 
not the latter, by delving into the contractual meaning of “actually working.” Thus, the 
Sixth Circuit treated the award as if it were a lower court ruling subject to ordinary 
appellate review. The arbitrator probably misinterpreted the contract. But the record 
shows that he based the award on a provision in the CBA. Thus, Alken-Ziegler conflicts 
with Eastern’s clear warning: “[A]s long as an honest arbitrator is even arguably 
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact 
that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his 
decision.”144 
• Finding No. 3(C): The Public Policy Test Makes No Significant Difference in Court 
Enforcement of Arbitrator Rulings. 
 
Table 1 shows that 42 awards were challenged in district courts on public policy 
grounds, and were confirmed in 34 cases (81.0%). On 22 occasions an award was taken 
before an appellate court and was confirmed 18 times (81.8%). This bears on the public 
 
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Judge Boggs dissented, believing that the disputed term, “actually working,” was ambiguous 
and therefore subject to the arbitrator’s interpretation. Id. at 868. He emphasized; “When the arbitrator must 
interpret a contract ambiguity, our case law is now quite clear (despite my dissent) that our review is 
restrained by one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence.” Id.
144 Eastern, supra note 76, at 62.   
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policy controversy in Misco145 and Eastern146 by showing that compared to other forms 
of award review, these challenges are now more likely to end in enforcement.   
 This finding is important but does not tell the whole story. Briefly, we examine 
three cases that offer valuable insights. In the first case (Eaton147), an employer who had 
taken its public policy challenge to district court and lost, and appealed the matter to a 
circuit court, dropped the issue after Eastern was decided. The second case (Sandvik148)
suggests that employers realize that the Supreme Court has strong concerns about public 
policy review of an award. As a consequence, they avoid a frontal assault on the award, 
and re-characterize their public policy argument in terms of the CBA. Employers contend 
that an award which violates a public policy also fails to draw its essence from the 
agreement, because no contract can be interpreted to circumvent the law. The third case 
(Mercy Hospital149) presents compelling facts that could prompt a court before Eastern to 
vacate a reinstatement award on public policy grounds. But in this example, the appellate 
court steadfastly refused to upset the arbitrator’s award. 
 Eaton Corp. v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Int’l 
Union150 is an example of an employer who abandoned its public policy challenge soon 
after the Supreme Court rendered its Eastern decision. An employee was lacerated fifteen 
minutes after starting his shift as a press operator.151 After he reported to the health 
 
145 Misco, supra note 72.   
146 Eastern, supra note 76.  
147 Infra note 150.  
148 Infra note 168.  
149 Infra note 177.   
150 9 Fed. Appx. 310 (6th Cir. 2001). 
151 Id. at 312. 
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department for treatment, the company administered a breathalyzer and urine test.152 The 
worker had a blood alcohol level of .18%, and tested positive for marijuana.153 Following 
more testing, Eaton discharged him.154 At arbitration, the union won reinstatement.155 
The arbitrator believed that the company lacked just cause because the individual’s 
substance use occurred away from work.156 Based on Eaton’s rules, as well as testimony, 
the arbitrator found that employees are not subject to discipline for off duty conduct.157
 This background provides context for the new development in Eaton. The 
company originally contended that the award violated a well defined public policy in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act against accommodating a current drug user.158 While its 
challenge was pending before the court of appeals, the Supreme Court issued Eastern.159 
In light of this ruling, Eaton withdrew its public policy argument,160 but continued to 
challenge the award on grounds that it failed to draw its essence from the CBA.161 
The Sixth Circuit explained that “[a]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably 
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,”162 a 
reviewing court’s belief that the arbitrator has committed serious error will not suffice to 
overturn the award.163 The arbitrator reasoned that urinalysis testing for illegal drugs only 
establishes “past drug use, not that the employee was using or was impaired on the 
 
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 312-13.  
157 Id. at 313.  
158 Id. at 313, n.4.  
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 313. 
162 Id. at 315. 
163 Id.
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job.”164 He also determined that employer rules that apply to the employment relationship 
should be enforced, while rules with no bearing on employment should be disallowed.165 
Consequently, the arbitrator concluded that the portions of the substance abuse policy 
which provided a second chance for some but not all workers who test positive were 
“unreasonable and therefore void.”166 Because the labor agreement specifically provided 
the arbitrator authority to interpret the contract and modify any penalty, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that “the proffered remedy was congruent with the CBA.”167 
The second case highlights a new type of public policy challenge, a hybrid 
approach that blends public policy and “essence of agreement” reasoning. In Paper 
Allied-Industrial Chemical v. Sandvik Special Metals Corp.168 an employee repeatedly 
taunted a co-worker by calling him a “queer,” “faggot,” “MF,” and “cocksucker.”169 The 
arbitrator characterized this conduct as “harsh language with sexual connotations.”170 He 
also concluded that the fired employee “engaged in verbal conduct of a sexual nature . . . 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”171 But the arbitrator 
mitigated the penalty by taking into account the harasser’s work history.172 
In challenging the reinstatement award, the company equated the employee’s 
name calling with conduct that the Supreme Court believes is sexual harassment.173 
164 Id.
165 Id. at 313. 
166 Id.
167 Id. at 315. 
168 132 Fed. Appx. 149 (9th Cir. 2005).  
169 See Sandvik Special Metals Corporation, Appellant, v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and 
Energy Workers International Union, Local 8-0369, AFL-CIO, f/k/a Local Union I-369, Oil Chemical and 
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Appellee., at 2004 WL 1216492 (Appellate Brief), at * 3. 
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at * 4.  
173 Id. at * 5 - * 8.  
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Blending its public policy and contract arguments, the company contended that the labor 
agreement, as interpreted by the arbitrator, violated the law.174 The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this reasoning: “We generally regard an arbitrator’s interpretation of a collective 
bargaining agreement as the final word on the meaning of the contract because both 
employer and union have granted to the arbitrator the authority to interpret the meaning 
of their contract’s language, including such words as just cause.”175 The court added that 
“[a]lthough strong public policy supports the prevention and reporting of harassment in 
the work force, no law, regulation, or precedent requires the Company to fire [an 
employee], without progressive discipline, for one allegation of harassment.”176 
Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass’n177 rejected a compelling 
public policy challenge. A hospital discharged a nurse with an excellent 25-year work 
history after she diverted drugs several times.178 The problem arose when the hospital 
installed an automated medicine dispenser.179 The nurse took too much medication to set 
up an intravenous drip bag for later use.180 She violated the hospital’s policy for the new 
dispenser,181 but did not divert medicine to an improper source or harm any patients.182 
174 Id. at * 10. The company’s brief said: 
The Company has not, and does not, argue that the Arbitrator’s reinstatement of Jackson 
violates the public policy underlying Rule 412. Rather, it is the Arbitrator’s interpretation 
of the collective bargaining agreement as permitting the intrusive, humiliating and 
unnecessary questioning of sexual harassment victims in arbitration hearings which 
violates the public policy of protecting harassment victims from such questioning. . . .  
The Arbitration Award violated the public policy of protecting harassment victims from 
unnecessary embarrassment by interpreting the collective bargaining agreement to permit 
a deeply flawed arbitration procedure. 
175 Sandvik, supra note 168, at 150. 
176 Id.
177 429 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2005).  
178 Id. at 340-41.  
179 Id. at 341.  
180 Id. at 342, n.1.   
181 Id. at 342.  
182 Id. at 346.  
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She followed an old practice of preparing medications ahead of time,183 instead of using 
an automated method to dispense and record medications. 
 The arbitrator determined that the nurse violated an important and reasonable rule, 
but reinstated her with reduced back pay because the penalty was too harsh in light of her 
lengthy and superior record.184 The hospital sued to vacate the award and was 
unsuccessful before the district court.185 On appeal the hospital lost again, as the First 
Circuit confirmed the arbitrator’s ruling.186 
The hospital said that the arbitrator’s award violated a clear and dominant public 
policy in Massachusetts of protecting patients from medical errors.187 The court rejected 
this reasonable challenge: “After stuffing this straw man, the Hospital proceeds to shred 
it, telling us that because [the nurse] improperly diverted drugs in contravention of the 
state regulatory scheme, reinstating her to a sensitive position violates public policy.”188 
The hospital ignored the fact that “the arbitrator, far from glossing over the discrepancies 
in the [dispenser] and SMS records, explicitly found that the Hospital had failed to prove 
that [the nurse] diverted any drugs away from patients.”189 The court explained that “even 
if the mandated reinstatement of a nurse found to have deliberately diverted drugs might 
violate an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy . . . the mandated 
reinstatement of a nurse who has been exonerated of all charges of intentional drug 
diversion, such as [this nurse], plainly would not.”190 
183 Id. at 342.  
184 Id. at 346.  
185 Id. at 343.  
186 Id. at 347.  
187 Id. at 344.  
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
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In a related vein, the hospital attempted to find a separate public policy violation 
in the reinstatement of a nurse who commits serious documentation errors. It argued that 
improper accounting for controlled substances, even if not deliberate, is intolerable.191 
The court agreed that the nurse’s conduct seemed to violate Massachusetts nursing 
regulations,192 but citing Eastern, it rejected the employer’s conclusion that this fact 
prohibited the arbitrator from ordering reinstatement order.193 
Overall, appellate courts are taking to heart the stern messages of Misco and 
Eastern. With few exceptions, the final judgment in a discharge case rests with the 
arbitrator. Courts are reluctant to intervene, even when compelling facts imply that 
reinstatement of an errant employee might pose a risk to the public or co-workers. The 
trend is the same, whether employers make conventional public policy challenges, or 
blend their theory with a Trilogy essence-of-agreement argument. 
• Finding No. 4: The Second and Seventh Circuits Were Significantly More 
Deferential to Arbitration, and the Fifth Circuit Was Significantly Less Deferential 
to Arbitration, Than All Others.    
 
Table 2 (infra) reports award confirmation rates by circuit courts of appeals. The 
center column shows district court results. The column on the right reports data for 
appellate courts. A statistical software program (crosstabs in SPSS) analyzed whether 
different enforcement rates among circuits were due to chance. All courts effectuate the 
Enterprise Wheel policy of judicial deference to awards, except in the Fifth Circuit. 
 
191 Id. at 345.  
192 Id., citing 244 Mass.Code Regs. 9.03(38)-(39).  
193 Id., using this strong language: 
Once the issue is framed in that manner, it becomes nose-on-the-face plain that the 
Hospital has failed to establish any barrier at all to [the nurse’s] reinstatement. Indeed, the 
Hospital has not identified a single iteration of positive law that prohibits the 
reinstatement of a nurse who, without causing injury to patients, made a few 
documentation errors or deviated slightly from doctors’ orders on a single occasion in a 
long and distinguished career. This failure strongly suggests that the reinstatement order 
does not violate public policy.  
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Higher than predicted award confirmation rates were observed in the Second Circuit194 
and Seventh Circuit.195 These high rates are not a problem for Enterprise Wheel because 
the Supreme Court has never expressed concern about too much judicial deference to 
arbitration. But the result for the Fifth Circuit defies the Supreme Court’s repeated 
concern about judicial interference in arbitration. District courts confirmed only 8 out of 
18 district courts awards (44.4%). The appeals court did nothing to correct this aberrant 
tendency, enforcing only 44.4% of disputed awards (in 4 of 9 cases). 
Two cases from the Seventh Circuit shed light on the result for very deferential 
courts. The Seventh Circuit uses Rule 11 sanctions, and clever word plays, more than any 
other court to restrain attorneys from launching meritless challenges to awards. 
Table 2 
Labor Arbitration Award Confirmation by Federal Circuits (April 2001-May 2006) 
 
District Court Confirmation     Appeals Court Confirmation 
 of Awards                                 of Awards 
First Circuit 10/14     (71.4%)   5/6       (83.3%) 
Second Circuit 14/15     (93.3%) *   1/1     (100.0%) 
Third Circuit 18/23     (78.3%)   4/7      (57.1%)  
Fourth Circuit   5/7       (71.4%)   2/3      (66.7%) 
Fifth Circuit   8/18     (44.4%) *   4/9      (44.4%)  
Sixth Circuit 42/53     (79.2%) 18/24    (75.0%) 
Seventh Circuit 15/17     (88.2%) *   8/9      (88.9%)  
Eighth Circuit 22/27     (81.5%)   9/11    (81.8%) 
Ninth Circuit 12/15     (80.0%)   8/8     (100.0%) 
Tenth Circuit   1/2       (50.0%)   1/1     (100.0%) 
Eleventh Circuit   4/5       (80.0%)    0 
D.C. Circuit   5/5     (100.0%)   1/1     (100.0%) 
 Chi-Square (U2) 33.815, df = 22, p 
< .051. * Indicates observed 
values that departed from 
expected values. 
Chi-Square (U2) 16.864, df = 22, p 
< .662. The result is not 
statistically significant, but may 
be due to the smaller sub-sample 
size. 
194 District courts enforced 14 out of 15 awards (93.3%). Interestingly, only one award was 
appealed and it was confirmed. This suggests that lawyers are so aware of the Second Circuit’s propensity 
to enforce awards that they do not bother to litigate labor arbitration awards before the appeals court. 
195 District courts enforced 15 out of 17 awards (88.2%), and 8 out of 9 awards (88.9%). 
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The court recently applied Rule 11 sanctions to make the point. The employer 
announced a plan to outsource twenty-two housekeeping jobs as a cost saving measure in 
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society v. Office & Prof. Employees Int’l Union, Local No. 
39.196 After negotiations with the union failed to lower wages, the company acted on its 
plan.197 The union’s grievance was sustained by the arbitrator.198 The award directed that 
the work be restored to the bargaining unit, ordered the parties to attempt to resolve back 
pay issues, and reserved the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to resolve any remaining controversy 
regarding implementation of the award.199 
The employer sued to vacate the award, contending that the company had a right 
to outsource this work and the arbitrator lacked authority to order the parties to negotiate 
the issue of damages.200 Besides confirming the award,201 the court ordered CUNA to pay 
the union its $9,132 attorney’s fees as a result of Rule 11 sanctions.202 Judge Cudahy  
re-emphasized “the long line of Seventh Circuit cases that have discouraged parties from 
challenging arbitration awards and have upheld Rule 11 sanctions in cases where the 
challenge to the award was substantially without merit.”203 
This decision did more than discourage long shot appeals of awards. It shouted a 
warning to attorneys who have unappeased arbitration clients to think twice before 
seeking redress in court.204 Judge Cudahy added in this case that the “precedent is clear 
 
196 443 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2006).  
197 Id. at 558-59.   
198 Id. at 559.  
199 Id. at 559-60.  
200 Id. at 560.   
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 561.  
204 Id., quoting the following admonition— the most strongly worded we have read in over 2,000 
federal court opinions— from Judge Posner in Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Dist. 
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and emphatic and directs us to uphold sanctions in a broad spectrum of arbitration cases. 
The filing of meritless suits and appeals in arbitration cases warrants Rule 11 
sanctions.”205 
The Seventh Circuit’s high deference to arbitration is also captured in a recent 
decision, Dexter Axle Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Dist. 90,206 that cleverly played on 
a word in Enterprise Wheel. Affirming the lower court, the Seventh Circuit declared: “It 
is abundantly clear that it is the arbitrator who is behind the driver’s wheel of 
interpretation, not the court. Great deference is paid to an arbitrator’s construction and 
interpretation of an agreement.”207 
In contrast, a Fifth Circuit decision, Continental Airlines, Inc. v. International 
B’hd of Teamsters, highlights this court’s propensity to re-arbitrate grievances.208 An 
airline mechanic, Mark Johnson, was randomly drug tested. He registered a blood alcohol 
content of .115, an amount above the legal limit for intoxication in Texas.209 Although 
 
8, 802 F.2d 247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986):  
A company dissatisfied with the decisions of labor arbitrators need not include an 
arbitration clause in its collective bargaining contracts, but having agreed to include such 
a clause it will not be permitted to nullify the advantages to the union by spinning out the 
arbitral process unconscionably through the filing of meritless suits and appeals. For such 
conduct the law authorizes sanctions that this court will not hesitate to impose. Mounting 
federal caseloads and growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and delays of 
litigation have made it imperative that the federal courts impose sanctions on persons and 
firms that abuse their right of access to these courts. . . . Lawyers practicing in the 
Seventh Circuit, take heed!   
205 Id.
206 418 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2005). The decision involved an incentive pay standard that was part of 
the parties’ CBA. The agreement specifically allowed the union to challenge incentive standards, and the 
arbitration clause provided for submission of such a dispute before an expert in the field of work 
measurement or an arbitrator who is experienced in arbitrating incentive grievances. Id. at 764. The 
company’s 1999 incentive standard was referred to arbitration, and the resulting award favored the union. 
Id., noting that the “Arbitrator shall have no power to set a standard and/or rate, or to establish methods or 
procedures. His authority shall be limited to reviewing whether the standard is proper and consistent with 
those established in the plant and has been properly applied.” The arbitrator granted affected employees 
lost wages resulting from the implementation of the new, improper standard. Id. at 765.  
207 Id. at 768. 
208 391 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2004).  
209 Id. at 615.  
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the airline discharged the employee, his grievance was resolved by reinstating him.210 
However, his Last Chance Agreement [LCA] set a long list of conditions, including more 
testing and an absolute prohibition against using medications that contain alcohol.211 
On March 20, 2001, the worker left a voicemail for the employee assistance 
program director stating that he was taking cough medicine.212 Continental tested the 
employee for alcohol two days later, and measured his blood alcohol content level at .04 
for the first test, and .029 for a confirmatory test.213 Continental terminated Johnson for 
consuming alcohol.214 The arbitrator issued an opinion holding that the last chance 
agreement was valid and binding.215 However, the award concluded that the employee 
had not violated this agreement and ordered Continental to reinstate him.216 
This case is featured because of its striking similarity to Eastern and Garvey. The 
company in Eastern fired a repeat drug-policy violator on two separate occasions after he 
used marijuana while driving heavy machinery on highways, only to be directed by 
arbitrators to reinstate him. The Supreme Court ordered enforcement of the disputed 
award, stating that “both employer and union have granted to the arbitrator the authority 
to interpret the meaning of their contract’s language, including such words as just 
cause.”217 In Garvey, the Ninth Circuit delved deeply into the record to reverse the 
arbitrator’s fact findings.218 This provoked a severe rebuke from the Supreme Court. 
Garvey emphasized that “established law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the 
 
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 616.  
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Eastern, supra note 76, at 62.  
218 Garvey, supra notes 94 & 97.  
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merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter 
how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”219 The Fifth Circuit ignored these clear 
examples and instructions from the Supreme Court. The appeals court re-arbitrated the 
grievance by making its own findings of fact.220 
• Finding No. 5: District Courts Confirmed 77.6% of Challenged Awards, an 
Increase of About 7 Percentage Points Compared to Our Earlier Studies of 
Litigated Awards from 1960-2001. The Confirmation Rate for Appellate Courts was 
76.3%, an Approximate Increase of 7 Percentage Points.  
 
Table 3 
Comparison of Federal Court Confirmation of Labor Arbitration Awards 
1960-2006 
District Court Rulings 
 
Confirm/Total 
Appellate Court Rulings 
 
Confirm/Total 
Appealed Awards 
 1960-1991
1991-2001
2001-2006
724/1008                     71.8% 
162/232                       70.3% 
156/201                        77.6% 
 
301/427                  70.5% 
77/116                     66.4%
61/80                       76.3%
219 Id., supra note 93.  
220 To support our conclusion that the court re-arbitrated the grievance, we quote at some length 
from Continental Airlines, supra note 208, at 620: 
Here, the [arbitrator] concluded that Johnson was in compliance with the LCA [Last 
Chance Agreement] . . . because he spoke with someone on his doctor’s staff and 
obtained approval from that person to take over-the-counter cough medicine. He then 
informed the EAP Director via voicemail that he was taking such medication. The record 
establishes that Johnson contacted his doctor’s office to schedule an appointment, that he 
spoke with a member of the doctor’s staff, and that the staff member informed Johnson 
that the doctor could not prescribe medicine without an appointment, but approved his 
taking over-the-counter cough medicine until his appointment date. There is no evidence 
of any kind that Johnson or a member of the doctor’s staff spoke with the doctor 
regarding Johnson’s situation, or that the doctor, either directly to Johnson, or indirectly 
to his staff, instructed Johnson to take over-the-counter cough medicine which contained 
alcohol. Thus, the uncontested evidence is that Johnson’s doctor never approved the use 
of the cough medicine he took, either orally or by a formal prescription. Because 
Johnson’s doctor did not prescribe him medicine containing alcohol, his notification to 
the EAP director, and that person’s not calling him back, is irrelevant.  
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Our current study follows two previous investigations into court review of labor 
arbitration awards. In the first study, award confirmation rates by district and appellate 
courts from 1960-1991 were respectively 71.8% and 70.5%.221 In a more recent study 
that examined court rulings from 1991-2001, very similar confirmation rates were 
observed: district courts enforced 70.3% of all challenged awards, and appellate courts 
confirmed 70.5% of awards.222 
The current sample (April 1, 2001 – May 31, 2006) shows the first marked 
departure— a notable increase— from this long trend with a district court enforcement 
rate of 77.6%. The confirmation rate among circuit courts has been more variable over 
the past 46 years. Our last measurement, a 66.4% award confirmation rate from 1991-
2001, registered a 4 percentage point drop from the previous period. Because appellate 
courts set precedents for district judges, the trend from 1991-2001 also posed potential to 
undermine the clear message of judicial deference in Enterprise Wheel. The data in Table 
2 for 1991-2001 suggest that the Supreme Court, near the end of that period, wisely 
intervened by deciding Eastern in 2000,223 and Garvey a year later.224 
The present confirmation rate of 76.5% for appellate courts has three-fold 
significance: (a) it is the highest rate we have ever measured in our database that begins 
with cases in 1960; (b) it is 10 percentage points higher than the previous period; and (c) 
the rate is especially significant because of the managerial role that appellate courts play 
in implementing Trilogy standards throughout the federal court system.   
 
221 LeRoy & Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy and Grievance Arbitration Appeals, supra note 11, 
at 102.  
222 LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts, supra note 11, at 49.  
223 Eastern, supra note 76.   
224 Garvey, supra note 85.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Words often play a larger role than statistics in communicating legal trends. The 
role of precedent in American legal culture leads to the belief that prominent opinions are 
barometers of broader judicial conditions. But we believe that statistics speak much 
louder than words, and tell a more important story about the independence of arbitration 
from courts. The findings show that federal courts are fulfilling the vision of judicial 
deference to awards in Enterprise Wheel.
Nonetheless, readers who worry about erosion of judicial deference to arbitration 
will find new material in our current research to stoke their concern. The most 
controversial evidence of judicial activism that we uncovered is the Sixth Circuit’s four 
part essence test. Judge Sutton condemned this test, remarking that no appellate standard 
except for those in Enterprise Wheel “requires more federal-court modesty than this one. 
Plain error, clear error, abuse of discretion, Chevron deference, AEDPA deference, 
substantial evidence and reasonableness all would seem to have more teeth than federal-
court review of arbitration awards.”225 He concluded that the four part essence test “has 
made it easier to vacate an arbitration award on the merits than the Supreme Court meant 
it to be.”226 
We have already shown that this seemingly intrusive standard does not lower 
award enforcement rates, but it stimulates an excessive amount of federal lawsuits.227 
Even if the enforcement rate is unaffected, the parties’ underlying bargain to make their 
award final and binding is seriously compromised. We, therefore, conclude that other 
 
225 Michigan Family Resources, supra note 117, at 659.  
226 Id. at 661.  
227 Id. The judge also found that among unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit vacated 25% of 
those awards (19 out of 75) on similar grounds. Id.
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circuits should avoid this standard. Also, the Sixth and Third Circuits should reconsider 
this test, and abandon it soon to ensure the finality of an outcome that is promised in an 
arbitration agreement. 
This begs the question: What reviewing standard should replace the four part 
essence test? We reflect on our reading of 2,064 federal court decisions that rule on 
award challenges from 1960 - 2006, and reconsider Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in 
Lincoln Mills.228 He saw nothing in the text or legislative history of Section 301 of the 
LMRA to authorize creation of a federal common law to enforce CBAs and their 
resulting arbitration awards. Section 301 was merely a procedural device— the creation 
of federal jurisdiction to apply state contract law to these disputes.229 Justice Frankfurter 
eerily wrote that Lincoln Mills attributed to Section 301 “an occult content.”230 
We can now say that the essence test from Enterprise Wheel validates Justice 
Frankfurter’s mystical allusion. No judicial standard could sound more like a potion from 
Harry Potter’s world than this essence test. By its very title, the more elaborate form of 
this standard— the four part essence test— looks like a witch’s incantation. The Sixth 
Circuit’s test offers a clear example of Justice Frankfurter’s prediction of “judicial 
inventiveness” in Section 301 litigation.231 
These observations inform our answer about a replacement standard for the four 
part essence test. Enterprise Wheel used a poor choice of words in referring to the 
 
228 Supra note 1.   
229 Id. at 475 (“Congress in its consideration of § 301 nowhere suggested dissatisfaction with the 
ability of state courts to administer state law properly. Its concern was to provide access to the federal 
courts for easier enforcement of state-created rights.”).  
230 Id. at 460-461.  
231 Id. at 465, adding: “There are severe limits on judicial inventiveness even for the most 
imaginative judges. The law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, and it cannot be drawn from there 
like nitrogen from the air.” Id. His point was that federal judges are not “peculiarly qualified” to fashion a 
body of common law for collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 464-465.  
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essence of an agreement. This gave impetus to a few judges who have activist 
inclinations, but more important in light of our data, encouraged even more lawyers to 
stir the arbitration cauldron in search of an “essence” problem.  
There is no need to find a verbal replacement for the four part essence test, and it 
is not practical to recant the more simple essence test in Enterprise Wheel. But if a 
replacement standard is desired, judges should simply recite the Supreme Court’s recent 
formulation— “as long as an honest arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the 
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that a court is convinced he 
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”232 This expresses the 
idea in the essence test, but with clarity. 
Second, a correction is needed for the Fifth Circuit’s long term deviation from the 
deferential posture that the Supreme Court has commanded. The results in Table 2 put 
judges in this circuit in an isolationist camp. At the district and appellate levels, Fifth 
Circuit courts confirmed awards in only 44.4% of the cases. This follows similar findings 
in our earlier studies. In 96 district court decisions from 1960-1991 judges confirmed 
only 57 awards, yielding an enforcement rate of 59.4%. For 1991-2001, appellate courts 
confirmed 2 out of 5 challenged awards, resulting in a 40% confirmation rate.  
This behavior exposes awards to a coin toss chance of non-enforcement, and 
ignores the precepts of Enterprise Wheel. More investigation is needed to see what 
factors explain this aberrant behavior. For now, our finding enables Fifth Circuit judges 
to see the problem and correct it by exercising more restraint.  
 For our third conclusion, we return to our finding that 16 appellate decisions 
 
232 Eastern, supra note 76, at 62.  
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confirmed awards that were vacated by district courts,233 while 5 awards were vacated by 
appellate courts after these arbitrator rulings were confirmed by lower courts.234 This 
measurement means that appellate courts are ensuring that lower courts adhere to 
Enterprise Wheel deference. As long as this ratio favors confirmation over vacatur— and 
notice the lopsidedness of this proportion— the precedent based judicial system will 
continue to send reinforcing Enterprise Wheel messages to district judges. 
Fourth, the results are a healthy indicator for the national policy that favors 
arbitration. Table 3 shows that labor arbitration is largely independent from court 
interference. Current award confirmation rates are high, and have jumped 7-10 
percentage points since the last measurement period. If judges give credence and effect to 
Enterprise Wheel during challenges to labor arbitration awards, this implies that other 
forms of arbitration also operate without court interference. 
 The Trilogy, and the popular soap opera that inspires are title, are remarkable for 
their continuing relevance. As in the TV show, the actors in the Trilogy have changed as 
a new generation of judges and arbitrators have come on to the scene. The antagonists— 
employers and unions— have changed, too, as have the viewers— lawyers and 
academics. But the underlying dramas that play out in courts and on TV are no different 
today compared to the 1950s and 1960s. We seriously doubt that As the World Turns 
would be a perennial favorite if the occasional judge in the show played a starring role, 
which leads to the fundamental conclusion of this empirical study: As challenges to 
arbitrator awards turn the Enterprise Wheel, federal judges play only a cameo role in the 
overall functioning of the nation’s labor arbitration system. 
233 See supra note 109.    
234 See supra note 110.   
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V. RESEARCH APPENDIX: SAMPLE OF CASES
Publication of the cases in our sample is not required but enables a reader to 
verify our empirical findings. Also, this list provides a valuable resource for lawyers and 
academics.  
 
AAF-McQuay v. United Electric, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 2003 WL 
5040449 (W.D.Va. 2003) 
 
Abel Const. Co., Inc. v. Kentucky State Dist. Council of Carpenters, 2004 WL 259590 
(W.D. Ky. 2004) 
 
Ace Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. International B’hd of Electrical Workers, Local Union 292, 
414 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2005) 
 
Airline Professional Assoc. of Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1224 v. 
ABX Air, Inc., 274 F.3d 1023 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 
Airline Professional Assoc. of Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1224 v. 
ABX Air, Inc., 2005 WL 2704900 (S.D. Oh. 2005) 
 
Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. UAW Local Union 985, 134 Fed. Appx. 866 (6th Cir. 2005) 
 
American Eagle Air Lines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Ass’n Int’l Union, 343 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 
2003) 
 
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1617 v. Federal Labor Relations 
Authority, 103 Fed.Appx. 802 (5th Cir. 2004) 
 
American Postal Workers Union, Philadelphia Local v. U.S. Postal Service, 222 
F.Supp2d 675 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
 
American Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Service, 2006 WL 908047 (D.D.C. 2006) 
 
American Train Dispatchers Ass’n v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2005 WL 2149300 (N.D. Oh. 
2005) 
 
Ameritech Corp. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 2005 WL 1272138 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) 
 
Anderson Concrete Co. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union 284, 2002 WL 
193578 (S.D. Oh. 2002) 
 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Local Union No. 744, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 280 F.3d 
1133 (7th Cir. 2002) 
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Antonio Origlio, Inc. v. Local Union No. 830, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
2001 WL 34355666 
 
Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc., United Steelworkers of Am., 245 F3d 601 (6th 
Cir. 2001) 
 
Archer-Daniels Midland Co. v. Int’l Longshoreman’s Ass’n, Local 1768-D, 268 
F.Supp.2d 944 (N.D. Oh. 2003)  
 
Arco Enterprises, Inc. v. Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n of U.S. & 
Canada, 124 Fed. Appx. 710 (3d Cir. 2005) 
 
Armco Employees Ind. Fed. V. AK Steel Corp., 149 Fed.Appx. 347 (6th Cir. 2005) 
 
Ball-Foster Glass Container v. American Flint Glass Workers Union, 354 F.Supp.2d 839 
(N.D. In. 2002) 
 
Beard Industries v. Local Union 2297, Int’l Union, UAW, 404 F.3d 942 (5th Cir. 2005) 
 
Bixby Medical Center, Inc. v. Michigan Nurses Ass’n, 142 Fed. Appx. 843 (6th Cir. 
2005) 
 
BP Products N.A., Inc. v. Paper, Allied Chemical and Energy Workers, Local Union 5-
0436, 2003 WL 21105078 (N.D. Oh. 2003) 
 
Brentwood Medical Associates v. United Mine Workers of America, 396 F.3d 237 (3d 
Cir. 2005) 
 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v. CSX 
Transp. Corp., 2005 WL 1863372 (M.D. Fl. 2005) 
 
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 266 F.3d 907 
(8th Cir. 2001) 
 
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Terminal Railroad Ass’n of St. Louis, 
307 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 2002) 
 
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2004 WL 
2296952 (N.D. Tex. 2004) 
 
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co., 2005 WL 
2600435 (W.D. Mo. 2005) 
 
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Paper, Allied-Chemical & Energy Workers, 309 F.3d 1075 (8th 
Cir. 2002) 
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Boston Medical Center v. Service Employees Int’l Union No. 285, 260 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 
2001) 
 
Bureau of Engraving v. GCIU, Local 1B, 284 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2002) 
 
Butler Mfg. Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2629, 336 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 
2003) 
 
Capitol Beverages Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Teamsters, Local 580, 211 F.Supp.2d 861 (W.D. 
Mi. 2002) 
 
Citgo Asphalt Refining Co. v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers Int’l 
Union, Local No. 2-991, 385 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 2004) 
 
City Market, Inc. v. Local No. 7, United Food & Comm. Workers Int’l Union, 116 Fed. 
Appx. 960 (10th Cir. 2004) 
 
City of New Orleans ex rel. Public Belt Railroad Commission v. United Transp. Union, 
2002 WL 287721 (E.D. La. 2002) 
 
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Driver Sales & Warehouse Local Union No. 117, 2004 
WL 2295987 (W.D. Wash. 2004) 
 
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 440 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2006) 
 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. V. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 991, 
411 F.Supp2d 1338 (S.D. Al. 2006) 
 
Communications Workers of America v. Verizon Services, Inc., 404 F.Supp.2d 62 
(D.D.C. 2005) 
 
Communications Workers of America, Local 987 v. Alcatel U.S.A. Marketing, Inc., 2003 
WL 21882423 (N.D. Tex. 2003) 
 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dist. 12, United Mine Workers of America, 2006 WL 481638 
(3d Cir. 2006) 
 
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 391 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2004) 
 
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society v. Office & Prof. Employees Int’l Union, Local No. 39, 
443 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 
Dalfort Aerospace Inc. v. Airline Div., Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2001 WL 640790 
(N.D. Tex. 2001) 
 
DBM Technologies, Inc. v. Local 277, United Food & Commercial Workers, 257 F.3d 
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651 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 
D.E.I., Inc. v. Ohio Vicinity Reg. Council of Carpenters, 155 Fed.Appx. 164 (6th Cir. 
2005) 
 
Deluxe Laboratories, Inc. v. IATSE Local 683, 2001 WL 115581 (C.D. Cal. 2001) 
 
Detroit Medical Center v. AFSCME Michigan Council 25, 2006 WL 800711 (E.D. Mi. 
2006) 
 
Detroit Typographical Union v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 283 F.3d 779 (6th Cir. 2002) 
 
Dexter Axle Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Dist. 90, 418 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2005) 
 
Dial Corp. v. Automotive, Petroleum & Allied Employees Union, Local 618, 183 
F.Supp.2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2001) 
 
Dist. Council No. 9 v. APC Painting, Inc., 272 F.Supp.2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
 
Dixie Warehouse & Cartage Co. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 
Union No. 89, 35 Fed. Appx. 169 (6th Cir. 2002) 
 
Dow Chemical Co. v. Local Union No. 564, 246 F.Supp.2d 602 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
 
Eagle Iron Workers v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Lodge 254, 2001 WL 1678741 (S.D. Ia. 
2001) 
 
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 17, 141 Fed. 
Appx. 164 (4th Cir. 2005) 
 
Eaton Corp. v. Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers Int’l Union, 9 Fed. 
Appx. 310 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 
Eisenmann Corp. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local No. 24, 323 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 
2003) 
 
Electrolux Home Products v. UAW, 416 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2005) 
 
Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 851, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 214 F.Supp2d 295 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) 
 
Emhart Teknologies LLC v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, Lodge 2396, 2006 WL 54011 
(W.D. Ky. 2006) 
 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Paper, Allied-Chemical & Energy Workers, Local Union No. 4-12, 
383 F.Supp.2d 877 (M.D. La. 2005) 
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Finley Lines Joint Protection Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 312 F.3d 
943 (8th Cir. 2002) 
 
Freightliner LLC v. Teamsters Local 305, 336 F.Supp.2d 1118 (D. Or. 2004) 
 
Ganton Technologies, Inc. v. Int’l Union, UAW Local 627, 358 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 2004) 
 
Gits Mfg. Co. v. Local 281, UAW, 261 F.Supp.2d 1089 (S.D. Ia. 2003) 
 
Glaziers Architectural Metal & Glassworkers Local 513 v. Bethalto Glass, Inc., 2006 WL 
381571 (E.D. Mo. 2006) 
 
Goulds Pumps, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of America, 39 Fed.Appx. 658 (2d Cir. 2002) 
 
Graham County Electric Cooperative v. Local Union No. 287, IBEW, 379 F.Supp.2d 
1066 (D. Az. 2005) 
 
Federacion Central de Trabajardes v. Vaquieria Tres Monjitas, Inc., 194 F.Supp.2d 61 
(D.P.R. 2002) 
 
Five Star Parking v. Local 727, 2005 WL 3502936 (D.N.J. 2005) 
 
Hampshire Comm. Action Commission v. UAW Local 2322, 2004 WL 989206 (D. 
Mass. 2004) 
 
Hartco Flooring Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 2005 WL 2300374 (E.D. Tenn. 
2005) 
 
Hawaii Teamsters & Allied Workers Union, Local 999 v. United Parcel Service, 241 
F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) 
 
Heavy Const. Lumber, Inc. v. Local Union 1205, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2001 
WL 984949 (E.D. N.Y. 2001) 
 
Highland Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12, 105 Fed. Appx. 728 
(6th Cir. 2004) 
 
Hoover Co. v. Local 1985, IBEW, 22 Fed. Appx. 470 (6th Cir. 2001) 
 
Highway & Local Motor Freight Employees Local Union No. 667 v. Wells Lamont, 69 
Fed. Appx. 300 (6th Cir. 2003) 
 
Huber, Hunt & Nichols v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing and 
Pipefitters, 282 F.3d 746 (9th Cir. 2002) 
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Humility of Mary Health Partners v. Local 377, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
296 F.Supp.2d 840 (N.D.Oh. 2003) 
 
Huntington Hosp. v. Huntington Hosp. Nurses Ass’n, 302 F.Supp.2d 34 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
 
Independent Chem. Corp. v. Local Union 807, Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2006 WL 
1071581 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
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2002) 
 
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Lodge No. 37 v, Dynamic Science, Inc., 322 F.Supp.2d 817 
(S.D. Tex. 2004) 
 
Int’l Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local Union No. 15 v. Rich Farms, Inc., 2005 WL 
2175132 (W.Va. 2005) 
 
Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Local Union No. S-251 v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator 
Mfg., Inc., 2002 WL 31696715 (W.D. Tenn. 2002)  
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Houston, LLC, 2005 WL 3262551 (S.D. Tex. 2005) 
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Co., 362 F.Supp.2d 1135 (D.N.D. 2005) 
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Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 507 v. Store Maintenance Services, Inc., 2005 WL 
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Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 333 v. Steamship Trade Ass’n of Baltimore, Inc., 
2001 WL 777080 (D.Md. 2001) 
 
Jamaica Buses Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, Local Union 100, 2003 WL 1621026 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
 
Jenni, Inc. v. Illinois Dist. Council No. 1 of Int’l Union of Bricklayers, 2002 WL 
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